Last month, I marked the 50th anniversary of the Declaration of Helsinki (DoH) by initiating a discourse on some of the most pertinent or controversial portions of that document. Hopefully, by now readers will have awakened sufficiently from the stupor induced by a 3-page discussion of medical research ethics to be receptive to a continuation of that monologue. Those who bravely navigated the entire editorial will recall that the topics covered included the obligations of an investigating physician to research subjects, the special protections owed to vulnerable groups, the importance of a scientifically rigorous research protocol, the controversial and imprecisely defined requirement for the provision of posttrial care, and the essential role of ethics committees in interpreting ethical guidelines against local and universal norms, applying them in detail to a specific research project, and then monitoring the research as it progresses.
Several important provisions of the DoH remain. One of the most provocative has been its approach to the use of placebos in controlled trials. The position espoused by the Declaration has evolved over the course of its 7 revisions toward a stance of greater restriction of placebo controls. 16 In paragraph 33, the DoH flatly states that ''the benefits, risks, burdens and effectiveness of a new intervention must be tested against those of the best proven intervention(s).'' Two exemptions to this rule are enumerated, the primary one being when no proven intervention exists. In that circumstance, the DoH states that ''the use of placebo, or no intervention, is acceptable.'' The second justification for an exception is more ambiguous: ''Where for compelling and scientifically sound methodological reasons the use of any intervention less effective than the best proven one, the use of placebo, or no intervention, is necessary to determine the efficacy or safety of an intervention,'' as long as such treatment will not expose the subjects to additional risk of ''serious or irreversible harm.'' In an apparent effort to prevent excessive latitude in the interpretation of this latter exception, the Declaration immediately adds that ''extreme care must be taken to avoid abuse of this option.''
The ethical motivation behind a restriction of placebo use in clinical trials is clear. If a proven treatment exists for a condition, especially one that can produce irreversible morbidity or death, it would seem to be ethically inappropriate to deny this treatment to some subjects by allocating them to a placebo. Another justification for restricting placebo use in such situations is a bit more subtle: It sets a low bar for endorsing a new treatment, as researchers only need to show that it is better than a sham intervention, rather than the best available one, to achieve a positive outcome. Of course, an investigator can also set a low bar with a positive control, simply by choosing a control treatment whose efficacy is actually debatable.
The appropriate use of placebos is a complex issue, and this section of the DoH has generated strong criticism from both directions. The first situation in which the DoH allows placebo use, for conditions that have no known effective treatment, is not very controversial. However, divergent opinions emerge when the discussion turns to whether a placebo control is ethical ''for compelling and scientifically sound methodological reasons'' in studies of conditions for which a proven treatment does exist. One argument for this exemption has been that conditions that are prone to a large placebo effect still require a placebo control to demonstrate efficacy unequivocally. 2 In such situations, the 3-armed trial, in which the experimental treatment is compared with the currently most effective one as well as a placebo, has been proposed as an equitable compromise. 14 However, adding a third arm to a trial while maintaining adequate power will normally increase the size and cost of the trial, so there are practical limitations to this approach. 9 An even more contentious rationale for forgoing comparison with the best available treatment is when the best treatment is too expensive to be practical for widespread use, especially in economically disadvantaged areas. Proponents of this argument might state that if the cost or administrative requirements of a treatment are prohibitive for a certain population, then in effect it does not exist for subjects belonging to that population and, furthermore, there is virtue in developing a new treatment that could help individuals who are currently going untreated. [8] [9] [10] This rationale, of course, assumes that if the new treatment is validated, it will be used in the disadvantaged populace.
This interpretation of what constitutes ''compelling and scientifically sound methodological reasons'' has led to attacks on this provision of the DoH for being too vague and liberal, thus introducing a ''double standard'' of ethical care for advantaged and disadvantaged populations. 5, 6 It is possible to understand both sides of this debate: this rationale could be dismissed as an unacceptable example of moral relativism, 12, 14 or embraced as a practical solution to a real-world situation in which resources are not unlimited. 9, 10, 14 This is certainly an issue for which scrutiny of each individual proposal by the reviewing ethics committee is crucial if abuse is to be avoided.
The Declaration's stance on the use of placebos has also been attacked for being too restrictive. 7, 10 Because many value the placebo-controlled trial as the most rigorous means to evaluate a new treatment, this provision has led many regulatory bodies to abandon the DoH and create their own guidelines for placebo use. 15 The proliferation of regulatory standards independent of the Declaration has caused some to characterize it as a minority report. 8, 15 Responding to such observations, a representative of the World Medical Association, guardian of the DoH, seemed comfortable with this development. ''[The DoH] is an ethical document and as such incorporates higher standards of behavior than laws and regulations might require; it can and does change from time to time and it is unrealistic to expect that countries will change their laws every time the WMA changes the Declaration of Helsinki. I don't think this undermines it-the Declaration of Helsinki is still a beacon for the research community.'' 15(p672) Paragraph 35 of the DoH, which deals with registration of research studies, clearly places the DoH ahead of the curve compared with current practice in the medical research community. Registration of prospective human trials is now commonplace and an accepted standard for randomized studies. The registration process serves 2 major purposes: First, it proclaims the existence of the trial at the time of its inception, making it more difficult to suppress negative results. Second, it publicly outlines the major parameters of the methodology, so that any later deviation from the plan can be detected when the study is submitted for publication. However, the most recent version of the Declaration now requires that ''Every [italics added] research study involving human subjects must be registered in a publicly accessible database before recruitment of the first subject.'' This stipulation constitutes an aspirational goal that, at the moment, outpaces contemporary practice by researchers conducting observational studies. 3 In the next paragraph, the DoH segues from the registration of research to its dissemination. Although the Declaration is designed primarily for the guidance of physicians conducting medical research, here it ventures into publication ethics and even addresses editors and publishers. This section admonishes researchers that the publication of their research is ''a duty.'' It specifically emphasizes that ''negative and inconclusive as well as positive results must be published or otherwise made publicly available.'' Studies have shown that publication bias against negative or inconclusive research is more commonly the result of it not being submitted for publication rather than being rejected disproportionately, 4, 11, 13 so researchers should not assume that this requirement is pertinent only for journal editors and publishers. Although individual journals such as AJSM may only be able to accept a small portion of submissions, the large number of currently available journals means that most studies will be able to find a home; posting on the authors' institutional website remains an option for studies not accepted in a journal.
The last 2 sentences of this paragraph appear to address journal editors directly. They specify that publications must reveal funding sources and other potential conflicts of interest, and research not in accordance with the principles of the DoH should not be published. AJSM has extensive guidelines for authors that address these and other ethical publication issues; like the DoH, these guidelines are regularly revised as new issues or loopholes in existing guidelines come to light. 1 The last paragraph of the Declaration is perhaps the most philosophically intriguing, because it evokes the sometimes hazy distinction between medical care and research. As it begins, the paragraph would seem to be far removed from orthopaedic sports medicine. It describes a situation that may arise in the care of a single patient, when no proven treatment exists or all known options have failed. In such a situation, says paragraph 37, it is ethical to try an unproven technique after expert consultation and informed patient consent, in the ''hope of saving life, re-establishing health, or alleviating suffering.'' The text goes on to specify that the new intervention should subsequently be made the object of research designed to test its safety and efficacy; the results should be recorded and, where appropriate, be made publicly available.
This paragraph conjures up the image of heroic interventions undertaken in a desperate attempt to reverse a fatal illness, certainly an event that rarely arises in a sports medicine context. On the other hand, as sports medicine practitioners we are dedicated to alleviating suffering of a very specific sort, and this is where I see the relevance of this section for us. We are by nature innovators and, as most of our treatment techniques yield less than perfect cures, we are continually looking for better ways to alleviate the morbidity of our patients. Although this creativity and drive to innovate is certainly not unique in medicine, it is a characteristic in which orthopaedic sports medicine particularly excels. Our innovations might involve a small tweak of an existing technique or an entirely new surgical procedure or technology. We may consider ourselves clinicians, not researchers, but when we innovate, we are ethically bound to monitor the results in order to determine whether the effect has been a positive one. Depending on the magnitude of our innovation, this might take the form of a routine audit of our surgical results or a formally approved research protocol. Having done so, our findings should be ''published, or otherwise made publicly available'' so that our colleagues can learn from the success or failure of our experience.
Although it begins with a preamble that establishes its context and purpose, the Declaration fails to provide a rhetorical peroration to summarize what has been presented. After paragraph 37, it just stops. This final paragraph, however, does evoke several of the Declaration's principal themes: the primacy of patient welfare in guiding all elements of medical research, the importance of monitoring by a disinterested but qualified third party, the necessity of informed patient consent, an imperative to weigh the potential benefit of an intervention or control procedure against the associated risks, the requirement of sound study design, and the obligation to make the results publicly available. Although we may
